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Background/aim: Coronavirus Infectious Disease 2019 (COVID-19) is now a pandemic spreading in most countries including Turkey.
Materials and methods: The current knowledge of COVID-19 and the virus causing it, SARS-CoV-2, was reviewed. The epidemiology
and control in different countries was compared and the differences discussed.
Results: The population attack rates and case fatality rates vary from country to country with Lombardy in northern Italy reporting
an attack rate in the general population of 0.37% compared to 0.004% in Hong Kong. The differences are caused by different testing
strategies and reporting systems.
Conclusion: Turkey is early in the outbreak. Different control strategies are available with South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore being
models to follow.
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1. Introduction
The World Health Organization (WHO) declared the
COVID-19 outbreak caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus
a pandemic on the 11th March [1].
Currently China, South Korea, Singapore and
Hong Kong seems to have the pandemic under partial
control with sporadic cases, but the number of cases is
currently increasing rapidly in most European Union
(EU) countries and the United States (US) [2].
Starting in Wuhan, Hubei Province, China, the
rate of global dissemination has accelerated, and
community spread is ongoing in many countries and as
per the 27th March there were 509,164 confirmed cases
and 23,335 deaths worldwide [2].
Containment is no longer a realistic goal in Europe
and the US, and radical and urgent efforts are needed to
mitigate the spread of infection, to avoid overwhelming
health care systems. Without urgent action, the impact
of this pandemic stands to become unprecedented
in recent history [3]. Here, we summarize key
epidemiological characteristics of the emerging SARSCoV-2 and try to forecast the challenges faced by
Turkey.

1.1. The 2003 SARS-CoV versus SARS-CoV-2
At the height of the 2003 SARS epidemic, 140 new infected
patients were reported weekly [4]. SARS-CoV had a
mortality rate of 9.7% and the majority of infections were
nosocomial. The SARS epidemic ceased in 2003 within the
year with a total of 8,098 reported cases with 774 deaths
globally [5].
A clear contrast to SARS-CoV is the rate of expansion
of the SARS-CoV-2 epidemic [6].The expert mission
of the WHO to China concluded that “transmission of
SARS-CoV-2 is mostly driven by clusters in close contacts,
particularly family clusters, and less so community
transmission” [7]. In addition, presymptomatic
transmission takes place up to the start of symptoms [8]
also in children [9,10].
The cases started to climb in Italy on 22nd February
with 9 cases reported (3 cases on the 21st) and it can
be argued that earlier mitigating measures could have
prevented the steep rise in cases up to 86,498 with 9,134
deaths by the 28th March with no signs of the peak being
reached yet [11]. In the United States, cases started to rise
in late February and have rapidly escalated upwards with
68,334 confirmed cases reported by 26th March [2].
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1.2. Why does SARS-CoV-2 spread so much more widely
than SARS?
SARS-CoV-2 has a high viral load at the onset of symptoms
that declines up to 5–6 days later [12,13]. In comparison,
for SARS-CoV excreted viral loads peaked at 6–11 days
after onset [14,15], which makes isolation and quarantine
of symptomatic individuals infected with SARS-CoV-2
much more challenging and less effective. Severe cases of
COVID-19 have higher viral loads and excrete virus longer
than mild cases [16]. Furthermore the SARS-CoV-2 spike
protein has a high affinity for the receptor on human cells,
the Acetylcholin-esterase-2, ACE2 [17].
1.2.1. Incubation period
An early study estimated the mean incubation period to be
5.8 (95% confidence interval-CI 4.6 – 7.9,) days, ranging
from 1.3 to 11.3 days [18].Another study estimated the
median incubation period to be 5.1 days (95% CI, 4.5 to
5.8 days), and found that 97.5% of those who developed
symptoms did so within 11.5 days (95% CI, 8.2 to 15.6
days) of infection [19].The average viral load in a study of
seven subjects in a family cluster was 6.76 × 105 copies per
swab during the first 5 days and live virus isolates were
obtained from swabs during the first week of illness [20].
1.2.2. Population immunity to the emerging virus
Pandemic of influenza (1918, 1957, 1968, 2009) spread in
populations with little immunity [21,22]. A key difference

between SARS-CoV-2 and pandemic influenza is the age
distribution of cases. Children rarely have severe clinical
illness but the infection attack rate in a household study
was similar for children and adults [23]. The Korean
government made a decision on school closure on 23rd
February 2020, when there were signs of community
spread [24]. The Korean response also included extensive
testing and the outbreak in and up to the 28th March 2020,
387,925 tests were performed, 9,478 cases were identified
of which 144 died. The epidemic curve in Korea is shown
in Figure [24]. It is probably too early to determine the role
of children in the spread of SARS-CoV-2 but the data so
far support that the infection may be spread by children
with few or no symptoms [24].
1.2.3. Transmissibility – R0
Various models applied to early SARS-CoV-2 epidemic
data found that an infected person spread the disease to an
average of 2.6 people, the basic reproductive rate R0. Thus,
after 10 generations of transmission, with each taking
about 5–6 days, a single case would expand to more than
3,500 new cases in the course of just two months in the
absence of mitigation strategies.
The R0 for SARS was estimated to be around 3 in the
absence of control measures [5].
The R0 values of SARS-CoV-2 has been estimated to be
2.9 (95% CI: 2.3–3.7) [16]. A later study estimated the R0 to

Figure. The Pandemic in Seoul, South Korea (Korea CDC) [24].
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be 3.6 [25]. The R0 values have important implications for
disease control [26]. The transmission has to be reduced
below 1 R0 to ensure extinction of the disease. At R0 = 2.2
the fraction not transmitting the disease to reduce R0 to
below 1 is 55% [26]. However, consensus is that rigorous
mitigation measures are needed early on in order to slow
down SARS-CoV-2 transmission [27].
For the 2009 A(H1N1)pdm influenza pandemic, initial
estimates of R0 was1.7 [28]. For the 1918 pandemic, Ro was
estimated in the first wave at around 2 [21]. Even the R0
for the 2003 SARS in the beginning was estimated to be
between 2 and 4 [29]. In contrast, MERS-CoV has a very
high case fatality (34%) and low transmissibility. Since
2012, MERS-CoVhas caused 2,494 reported cases and
858 deaths in 27 countries. MERS-CoV has also caused
some nosocomial outbreaks, mainly in hospitals in Saudi
Arabia, Jordan, and South Korea. However, estimates of
MERS-CoV R0 are less than 1, and thus far it has been
contained [30].
2. Excess mortality from influenza and Covid-19
Clinical case fatality rates based on case definitions used
in the Wuhan outbreak (fever and respiratory syndrome
including pneumonia) are around 5% in the Hubei
Province but far lower in the rest of China and South
Korea, around 1.0% [31]. The latest data from Lombardy
from the 27th March show that 30% of known cases are
in hospital and 4.3% are in intensive care units (ICU)
equivalent to 16 per 100,000 population [11]. Lombardy
has a population of 10 million and the population attack
rate as of 21st March is 0.37% and the population mortality
rate is 45 per 100,000 [11].
A study of the 1957 influenza A(H2N2) pandemic
found an excess respiratory mortality rate of 19 per
100,000 population (95% CI, 12-26 cases per 100,000
population) on average for the entire three year pandemic
period of 1957–1959 [32]. The global mortality estimate
was moderate relative to that of the 1918 pandemic but
was approximately 10-fold greater than that of the 2009
pandemic [32].
A study from Denmark of the 2009 A(H1N1) influenza
reported that the proportion of beds used for pandemic
influenza cases did not exceed 4.5% of the total national
ICU bed capacity [33]. Hospitals with cases used a median
of 11% of ICU beds for pandemic influenza patients
(range: 3%–40%). The population attack rate peaked at 5%
in the week of 22 November 2009 [34].
2.1. Cumulative incidence and mortality from SARSCoV-2
The numbers reported from the epicenter in China,
Hubei province (59.170 million population) were 67,466
confirmed cases and 2,902 deaths, equal to a cumulated
population attack rate of 0.11% and a cumulated fatality
rate of 4.8 per 100,000 population [30]. This is far lower

that the currently recorded fatality rate in Lombardy,
Italy, of 44 per 100,000. A different age structure of the
population cannot explain the ten-fold higher mortality
in Lombardy (Table 1) and underreporting in China is
possible.
The critical question in the interpretation of these
findings is what the extent of the epidemic has been, when
including mild and asymptomatic cases [6].
The first case in Turkey was reported on March 10th,
much later than in many European countries. The case
had a history of travel from Europe. On March 12th, 4
new cases were reported with a steep rise to 2,433 out of
33,004 tested (7%) within 14 days as of March 25th with
a death rate of 2.4% (n = 59). The daily number of tests
was reported to be 5035 on day 14 and by the 27th March
3629 were recorded by the WHO with 75 deaths. On day
24 of the epidemic, the total number of tests was 125,556,
positive cases was 18,135, with 356 deaths. A total of 1,101
cases were hospitalized in the ICU out of which 783 were
intubated. İstanbul has the highest number of cases (n =
8852) compared to others followed by İzmir (n = 853),
Ankara (n = 712) and Konya (n = 584) [35]. Detailed
information is not available on gender, age, clinical stage
and prognosis of the identified cases. The start of the
epidemic shows great similarity with the rapidly rising
trend observed at the early stages in Italy and Spain.
Although the health authorities and the government in
Turkey were quick to take action by cancelling schools and
social, cultural, sports activities and scientific meetings, a
nationwide lockdown was not put into practice. A rough
estimation of the number of ill people and the number of
deaths for Istanbul (20 million inhabitants) according to
different scenarios from different countries and provinces
(Table 1) shows that the consequences of an epidemic
similar to that in Italy would be devastating.
In Table 2, we have tried to estimate the impact of the
pandemic in Istanbul using numbers from Hubei (China),
Lombardy (Italy), South Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong.
2.2. What have other countries done?
Korea
The development of the SARS-CoV-2 infection
illustrates how rapid the numbers increase in Figure. The
numbers went from 2 daily cases to 909 from the 18th
February to the 29th February. Extensive testing was
applied to cases and contacts and a total of 387,925 tests
or up to 10,000 per day were run to identify cases and
contacts and quarantine them [24].
Singapore
Singapore was one of the worst affected areas in the
2003 SARS outbreak, and since then Singapore has steadily
built up its outbreak preparedness, including developing
a national pandemic preparedness plan based on risk
assessment and calibration of response measures that are
proportionate to the risk [36].
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Table 1. Estimated number of deaths in İstanbul if attack rates in different countries and areas
are applied. Turkey has a population over 70 years of 5.86.9% (2019) [39].
Attack rate
%

Population over
65-70 years (%)

Deaths per 100,000

Lombardy, Italy [11]

0.34

22.5

25.2

Hubei province, China[31]

0.11

10.1

5.2

South Korea [24]

0.017

13.5 *

0.2

Singapore [37]

0.007

10.1 **

0.03

Hong Kong [2]

0.004

14.2 ***

4.3

* South Korea Population (2018). Worldometers [online]. Website www.worldometers.info
[accessed 27th March 2020].
** Singapore Department of Statistics (2020). Population and population structure [online].
Website https://www.singstat.gov.sg/find-data/search-by-theme/population/population-andpopulation-structure/latest-data [accessed 27 March 2020].
*** United Nations Statistics Division (2020). Demographic and Social Statistics [online]
Website
https://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic-social/ [accessed 27 March 2020].

This includes holding regular exercises, and building
the National Centre for Infectious Diseases (NCID), a 330bed purpose built infectious diseases management facility
with integrated clinical, laboratory and epidemiologic
functions.
Some data from Singapore are shown in Table 1. Up
to the 27th March, Singapore had reported a total of 683
cases with 2 deaths. The Ministry of Health (MOH) had
developed a local case definition already by the 2nd of
January 2020 and SARS-CoV-2 real-time polymerase chain
reaction (RT-PCR) laboratory testing capacity was scaled
up rapidly to all public hospitals in Singapore to handle
2,200 tests a day. All contacts were assessed by telephone
for fever or respiratory symptoms by public health officials
during the quarantine or monitoring period, thrice daily
for close contacts and once daily for contacts at lower risk.
In late January 2020 the following groups were tested
for COVID-19:
1) all hospitalized patients with pneumonia (later
expanded to include patients with pneumonia evaluated
in primary care settings);
2) ICU patients with possible infectious causes as
determined by the physician;
3) patients with influenza-like illness at sentinel
government and private primary care clinics included in
the routine influenza surveillance network; and
4) deaths from possible infectious causes [37].
3. Do interventions matter and what can we do?
The pandemic due to the SARS-CoV-2 virus has caused
high morbidity and mortality in the elderly, much higher
than influenza. However, in contrast to influenza, children
seem to be less severely affected.
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Table 2. Estimating number of ill people and number of deaths in
İstanbul (20 million inhabitants) according to different scenarios
from different countries and provinces.
Scenario

Number of ill
people in İstanbul

Number of
deaths

Lombardy (Italy)

54,000

5,060

Hubei (China)

22,000

1,043

South Korea

3,400

40

Singapore

1,400

6

The tools we have available with a new infection
causing a pandemic including no specific treatment such
as antivirals, no vaccine and a nonimmune population are
no different than the tools available during pandemics of
the past century and going back as far as to plague in the
14th century: quarantine and mobility restrictions.
A study of the mortality in 17 US cities during the 1918
pandemic found that cities in which multiple interventions
were implemented at an early phase of the epidemic had a
50% lower peak mortality than those that did not and a
20% lower mortality rate in the course of a delayed, flatter
epidemic curve [38].
This clearly demonstrates that mitigating policies are of
paramount importance and make a difference, not only by
lowering mortality, but also ensuring that the burden on
the health care system remains manageable.
Thus, social distancing and home quarantine should
be practiced in countries with local transmission. This
is urgent, as the window of opportunity is small. The
examples of China, Singapore and some initial success in
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Korea show that it is possible to influence the spread of
SARS-CoV-2, but that the societal and economical costs
will be enormous and long-lasting.
Implementations already done in Turkey are:
· School closure as children with few symptoms may
contribute to community spread (1 day after the first case);
· Prohibiting public gathering and cancelling all public
events like football matches, theater, cinema, religious
gatherings (1 to 5 days after the first case);
· Ensuring that the health care system is prepared by
revising protection of health care workers (procedures and
use of personal protective equipment-PPE);
· Revising the available ICU capacity and being
prepared to cancel elective surgery needing ICU backup;
· Isolating cases that do not need hospitalization and
quarantine all contacts.

Still recommendable options available for Turkey are:
· Continue to ensure a large testing capability with
rapid availability of results. At the height of the outbreak
in South Korea 10,000 test were done daily (reached after
several weeks over 20,000 daily in Turkey);
· Continue to ensure procurement of an adequate and
timely supply of PPE in each hospital;
· Provide a healthy work environment and reasonable
working hours for healthcare providers;
· Consider taking advice and learning from countries
like Korea, Singapore and China which has by now
managed to control the pandemic in their respective
countries.
Disclaimers
No funding has been received for this study.
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